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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jeremy Todd Hill filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After the district court
gave notice of its intent to dismiss the petition for being untimely filed, Mr. Hill asserted
that equitable tolling applied to his petition. Equitable tolling applied to Mr. Hill's petition
because he was denied his constitutional right of access to the courts.

The United

States Supreme Court has held that the right of access to the courts requires the State
to provide inmates with either adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law.
access to case law.

The prison law library here did not provide inmates with

The prison "paralegals" were prohibited from giving any legal

advice to inmates. Because the State did not furnish adequate law libraries or adequate
legal assistance, Mr. Hill was denied his constitutional right of access to the courts. The
district court nonetheless dismissed the petition with prejudice on the ground that the
action was untimely, after determining that the doctrine of equitable tolling did not apply
to Mr. Hill's petition.
On appeal, Mr. Hill asserts that the district court erred when it dismissed his
petition, because he was denied his right of access to the courts and equitable tolling
therefore applies.

He respectfully requests that the Idaho Supreme Court retain his

case to determine whether the State's provision of law libraries and legal assistance to
inmates is constitutionally sufficient.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On March 28, 2011, Mr. Hill was sentenced in Twin Falls County No. CR 20108819 to a stipulated sentence of six and one-half years fixed for the crime of trafficking
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methamphetamine.

(R., pp.12, 266.)

Mr. Hill did not appeal from the judgment of

conviction and sentence. (R., p.266.)
On July 17, 2012, Mr. Hill filed, prose, a petition and affidavit for post-conviction
relief.

(R., pp.12-17.)

In the post-conviction petition, Mr. Hill alleged ineffective

assistance of counsel, and that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. (R.,
pp.13-14.) He also filed a motion and affidavit in support for appointment of counsel.
(R., pp.30-32.)
The district court entered an order denying the motion for appointment of counsel
and giving its notice of intent to dismiss the petition. (R., pp.33-35.) It appeared to the
district court that the petition was untimely filed, because the petition was filed outside
the limitations period of one year and forty-two days after entry of the judgment of
conviction mandated by Idaho Code section 19-4902. (R., pp.33-34.) Because there
was no direct appeal, the petition had been filed some two months and eight days late.
(See R., p.34.)
Mr. Hill then filed a reply to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss the
petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.37-48.) In the reply, Mr. Hill conceded that the
district court used the correct dates, and that there had been no direct appeal.

(R.,

pp.37-38.) However, Mr. Hill also asserted that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the
applicable statute of limitations. (R., p.38.) Mr. Hill stated that no appeal had been filed
because of the ineffective assistance of his defense counsel. (R., p.43.)
After his sentencing, Mr. Hill was in custody at the Twin Falls County Jail and the
Ada County Jail for about eleven or twelve days. (R., p.43.) He was then sent to the
Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI) and placed in the Reception and Diagnostic
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Unit (RDU) for about twenty-one days. (R., p.43.) He was then placed in segregation in
Unit 8 for about two weeks, briefly returned to RDU to complete the intake process, and
again placed in Unit 8. (R., p.44.) Mr. Hill was subsequently placed in administrative
segregation at the Idaho State Maximum Security Institution (IMSI). (R., p.44.)
Mr. Hill asserted that "[d]uring this period of time, approximately 70 to 110 days,
the Petitioner could not file a Petition for Post Conviction Relief, because he was not
allowed to have any of his legal materials or papers." (R., pp.43-44.) Additionally, he
could not file a petition for post-conviction relief because "there [were] no legal
reference materials available to him ... there was no one trained in the law to assist the
Petitioner in filling out the necessary forms," and "there [were] no law books containing
case law from the United States Supreme Court; the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; the
Idaho State Supreme Court; or the Idaho Court of Appeals."

(R., pp.44-45.)

Thus,

Mr. Hill asserted that "during the 70 to approximately 110 days that he was denied
access to his own legal documents, and denied access to the laws of the State of Idaho,
and denied access to ANY case precedent, that he is also entitled to equitable tolling
during this period of time." (R., p.45.)
The district court subsequently entered an order appointing counsel and directing
the State to file an answer, because Mr. Hill "raise[d) an arguable equitable tolling claim
which if accepted by the Court would make his petition timely filed." (R., pp.49-50.) The
State later filed an answer, which raised the affirmative defense that Mr. Hill "has failed
to file his petition within the one year statute of limitation and the claims are now timebarred." (R., pp.67-70.)
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The State also filed a request for judicial notice, asking the district court to
consider numerous documents.

(R., pp.79-196.)

The documents included an ISCI

Individual Activity Log and several Access to Courts Requests, which indicated that
Mr. Hill had been able to receive legal documents from the ISCI paralegal in April and
May of 2011. 1 (R., pp.100-06.) Mr. Hill had not requested the post-conviction packet
from the paralegal until June 2012. (R., pp.100, 108.) However, the documents also
indicated that the paralegal was prohibited to give legal advice to Mr. Hill.

(R.,

pp.100, 106.)
Mr. Hill then filed supplemental affidavits in response to the State's motions. (R.,
pp.198-213.) The affidavits, from other inmates at ISCI, averred that inmates can only
go to the ISCI resource center "to make copies, mail documents, or get a document
notarized." (R., pp.200, 205, 208.) The affidavits also stated that inmates do not know
what books they can or cannot check out, because there is no list of books contained
within the resourse center. (R., pp.200, 205, 208.) Additionally, the affidavits averred
that there is no access to any case law. (R., pp.200, 205, 208.) The affidavits further
stated that "[t]here is no one who is trained in the law to assist inmates in the
preparation of legal documents."

(R., pp.201, 206, 209.)

Inmates who ask the

paralegal at the resource center for assistance are simply told that the paralegal may
not give legal advice. (R., pp.201, 206, 209.) In sum, the affidavits averred that "there
is no form of legal research available to the inmates in Idaho." (R., pp.201, 206, 209.)

The requested documents included a Credit for Time Served packet and a Power of
Attorney packet. (R., p.100.)
1
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The State subsequently filed a supplemental request for the district court to take
judicial notice of the Idaho Department of Correction's Standard Operating Procedure
on Access to Courts, Authorized Resource Materials List, and List of Litigation Self-help
Packets. (R., pp.232-258.)
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the equitable tolling issue and
took the case under advisement. (R., pp.259-60.) Later, the district court entered a
memorandum opinion and a judgment dismissing with prejudice Mr. Hill's petition for
post-conviction relief. (R., pp.266-77.) In the memorandum opinion, the district court
found, "for purposes of his hearing only," that Mr. Hill "was effectively denied access to
the courts" for the eleven or twelve days he was housed in the Twin Falls County Jail
and the Ada County Jail following his sentencing.

(R., pp.268-69 (emphasis in

original).) Thus, the district court deemed the statute of limitations tolled for that number
of days. (R., p.269.)
However, the district court determined that after Mr. Hill was initially placed in the
RDU at ISCI, he attended an orientation presentation by the prison paralegal, which
included the presentation of a document containing information about post-conviction
relief and explaining the deadline for filing a post-conviction petition.

(R., p.269.)

Mr. Hill also received information on how to request self-help litigation packets from the
prison resource center. (R., pp.269-70.) Additionally, the "Access to Courts Request
Form" was discussed during the presentation. (R., p.270.) The district court found "that
even though [Mr.] Hill does not remember receiving the orientation and the written
documents that he in fact did receive both." (R., p.270.) Thus, the district court was
convinced that Mr. Hill "was provided materials . . . which permitted him to obtain
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assistance from the penitentiary resource center and would have allowed him to timely
file a post-conviction petition had he read the document." (R., p.270.) The district court
determined that Mr. Hill's failure to read the documents provided at his orientation would
be "inexcusable ignorance denying him the right to relief." (R., pp.270-71.)
The district court also found that Mr. Hill's assertion that he was denied access to
the courts during the approximately ten days he was in administrative segregation at
IMSI was not credible. (R., p.271.) The district court further mentioned that nothing in
the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act (hereinafter, UPCPA) requires the petitioner
to get the records from the underlying criminal case before filing a petition. (R., p.271.)
Additionally, the district court found that Mr. Hill "did have access to the resource
center and hence the courts during the time he was in maximum security." (R., p.272.)
The district court then found that Mr. Hill "was not denied access to the courts from
September 2011 through June 3, 2012, the date on which he requested a postconviction packet from the resource center." (R., p.272.) Because Mr. Hill was required
to file his petition by May 10, 2012, "[e]xtending that time by 12 days to [May 22, 2012]
is of no avail because [Mr.] Hill did not even request the packet until after the statute of
limitations had expired." (R., p.273.)
Further, the district court found that the prison paralegal fulfilled the constitutional
right of access to the courts. (R., p.273.) As the district court stated, "[t]he fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in
the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with
adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." (R.,
p.273 (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).) The district court found that "the
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paralegals did in fact make statements that they could not provide legal advice to
[Mr.] Hill. They are not lawyers and under penitentiary policy and Idaho State law, they
cannot provide legal advice to inmates." (R., p.273 (emphasis in original).) However,
the district court stated that Mr. Hill was not denied access to the court, because
"[p]aralegals can and do provide assistance in completing forms .... Prison authorities
are not required to provide legal advice.

The penitentiary paralegal fulfilled the

Constitutional obligations by assisting [Mr.] Hill in filling out the packet." (R., p.273.)
Additionally, the district court found that Mr. Hill did not demonstrate any
prejudice as a result of not receiving legal advice as required by the Constitution. (R.,
p.274 (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).)

According to the district court,

Mr. Hill had raised the issue of whether a violation of his right to access the courts
justified application of equitable tolling, and not the issue of whether his petition was
inadequate.

(R., p.274.)

"Particularly there is no allegation that the paralegals

misadvised [Mr. Hill] as to the time requirements for filing the petition, purposely
committed any act which delayed the timely filing, or in any way hindered [Mr.] Hill's
preparation of his petition." (R., p.274.) The district court stated that "[a]ny prejudice in
this case derived from [Mr.] Hill's own failure to timely request assistance from the
penitentiary paralegal, not from the paralegal's inadequate advice or improper training,
or other lack of legal resources in the penitentiary." (R., p.274.) While the district court
found that "the Idaho State penitentiary does not have a complete law library," it
declared that fact did not entitle Mr. Hill to relief "because the adequacy of his petition is
not at issue here."

(R., p.274.)

"By the time [Mr. Hill] finally requested the post-
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conviction packet, the statute of limitations had already run. The prejudice here was of
[Mr.] Hill's own making, not of the government's." (R., p.274.)
Thus, the district court found "no factual basis for applying the equitable tolling
doctrine in this case," and dismissed with prejudice Mr. Hill's petition for post-conviction
relief. (R., pp.275, 277.)
Mr. Hill then filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Memorandum
Opinion and Judgment denying post-conviction relief. (R., pp.279-81.)

8

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it dismissed, with prejudice, Mr. Hill's petition for postconviction relief, because Mr. Hill was denied his right of access to the courts and
equitable tolling therefore applies?

9

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed, With Prejudice, Mr. Hill's Petition For PostConviction Relief, Because Mr. Hill Was Denied His Right Of Access To The Courts And
Equitable Tolling Therefore Applies

A.

Introduction
Mr. Hill asserts that the statute of limitations on his petition for post-conviction

relief should be equitably tolled because he was denied his right of access to the courts.
Thus,

the

district

court

erred

when

it

dismissed

with

prejudice

his

post-

conviction petition.
B.

Standard of Review
The Idaho Supreme Court outlined the applicable standard of review in Rhoades

v. State, 148 Idaho 247 (2009):
This Court has free review of questions of law. On review of a dismissal
of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this
Court determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file
and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-moving party. However, while the underlying facts must be
regarded as true, the petitioner's conclusions need not be so accepted.
Where the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than
a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite
the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be
responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. These
standards apply equally to questions regarding the accrual of actions and
the passage of the statute of limitations.

Id. at 250 (citations, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted).
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C.

Equitable Tolling Applies To The Statute Of Limitations In An Inmate's PostConviction Proceeding Where The Inmate's Right Of Access To The Courts
Was Denied
If an inmate's right of access to the courts was denied, equitable tolling applies to

the statute of limitations in the inmate's post-conviction proceeding.
1.

The Right Of Access To The Courts

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds

v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 191 (2001 ). In
Bounds, the United States Supreme Court held "that the fundamental constitutional right
of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation
and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries
or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.
Idaho's courts have long recognized that the fundamental constitutional right of access
to the courts requires the State to furnish either adequate law libraries or adequate legal
assistance. E.g., Coleman v. State, 114 Idaho 901 (1988); Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho
530 (Ct. App. 1997).
In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), the United States Supreme Court held
that an inmate must show actual injury to allege a violation of the right of access to the
courts. This requirement stems from the constitutional doctrine of standing. Lewis, 518
U.S. at 349. The Court clarified its earlier decision in Bounds, explaining that rather
than establishing the right to a law library or to legal assistance, Bounds "acknowledged
... the (already well-established) right of access to the courts." Id. at 350 (emphasis in
original). "Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library
or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by
11

establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some
theoretic sense." Id. at 351. Rather, because "meaningful access to the courts is the
touchstone" of the right vindicated by Bounds, "the inmate ... must go one step further
and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance
program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim."

Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).
He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed
for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of
deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have
known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished
to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law
library that he was unable even to file a complaint.
Id.
In other words, the Lewis Court held that Bounds requires prisons to provide the
tools "that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally,
and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement."

Id. at 355.

The

requirement from Bounds is disjunctive: prisons may provide meaningful access to the
courts either through furnishing adequate law libraries or through furnishing adequate
legal assistance. See id. at 356. Bounds "guarantees no particular methodology but
rather the conferral of a capability-the capability of bringing contemplated challenges
to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts." Id.
When any inmate, even an illiterate or non-English-speaking inmate,
shows that an actionable claim of this nature which he desired to bring has
been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is currently
being prevented, because this capacity of filing suit has not been
provided, he demonstrates that the State has failed to furnish "adequate
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law."
Id. (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828) (emphasis in original).
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In Lewis, the Court affirmed the district court's finding that two prisoners showed
the requisite actual injury to allege a violation of the right of access to the courts. Id. at
356-57. One inmate showed actual injury because his lawsuit had been dismissed with
prejudice, and the second inmate showed actual injury because he had been unable to
file a legal action. Id. at 356.
2.

The Standard For Equitable Tolling Of The Post-Conviction Statute Of
Limitations, Based On The Denial Of Access To The Courts, Is
Coextensive With The Bounds Standard For Finding A Violation Of The
Right Of Access To The Courts

Under the statute of limitations for post-conviction actions in Idaho, a petition for
post-conviction relief may be filed at any time within one year from the expiration of the
time for appeal in the underlying criminal case, or from the determination of the appeal,
whichever is later. I.C. § 19-4902(a); Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 628 (Ct. App.
1992). The failure to file a timely post-conviction petition is a basis for dismissal. Sayas
v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959 (Ct. App. 2003).

"The statute of limitations for filing an application for post-conviction relief may be
tolled if the applicant has been effectively denied access to the courts."

State v.

Ochieng, 147 Idaho 621, 626 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Martinez, 130 Idaho at 535-36).

The standard for equitable tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations, based on
the denial of access to the courts, is coextensive with the Bounds standard for finding a
violation of the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. For example, in
Ochieng, the Idaho Court of Appeals declared: "To demonstrate the denial of

meaningful access to the courts, an inmate must show that shortcomings in the prison
legal program prevented his effort to pursue a claim. See Lewis v. Casey, [518 U.S.
343, 351-53] (1996)." Ochieng, 147 Idaho at 626. Similarly, in Martinez the Idaho Court
13

of Appeals held "that Art I, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution imposes the same
requirement for provision of adequate prison law libraries or adequate legal assistance
that the United States Supreme Court articulated in Bounds as a requirement of the Due
Process Clause." Martinez, 130 Idaho at 536.
Indeed, the access to courts standard for equitable tolling is coextensive with the
Bounds standard because both are rooted in due process concerns.

The Idaho

Supreme Court has recognized that a claim asserted in post-conviction may "raise
important due process issues sufficient to trigger equitable tolling." Rhoades, 148 Idaho
at 251. The Idaho Supreme Court has also acknowledged that "[t]he right of access to
courts has been grounded in the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution."
Evensiosky, 136 Idaho at 191.

In Martinez, the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed an inmate's equitable tolling
argument based on the denial of the constitutional right of access to the courts under
article I, section 18 of the Idaho Constitution. Martinez, 130 Idaho at 532, 535. In light
of "the apparent similarity in purpose" of the federal Fourteenth Amendment and article
I, section 18, the Court "consider[ed] precedents applying the right of access to the
courts under the federal Due Process Clause." Id. at 535. The Martinez Court, after
considering Bounds, concluded that "[w]ithout either access to Idaho legal reference
books ... or the availability of representation by persons trained in Idaho law and
procedure, prisoners would find the Art. I, § 18 guarantee that 'courts of justice shall be
open to every person,' a hollow promise." Id. at 535-36. Thus, the Court held "that Art.
I, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution imposes the same requirement for provision of
adequate prison law libraries or adequate legal assistance that the United States
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Supreme Court articulated in Bounds as a requirement of the Due Process Clause." Id.
at 536.

The Court then held that, "if [the defendant] were to sustain his burden of

proving [an abridgement of his access to Idaho courts] at an evidentiary hearing, the
limitation period for his post-conviction action would be deemed tolled until [the
defendant] was afforded access to Idaho courts .... "2 Id.

Thus, the access to the

courts standard for equitable tolling is coextensive with the Bounds standard.
D.

Equitable Tolling Applies To The Statute Of Limitations In Mr. Hill's PostConviction Proceeding, Because Mr. Hill's Right To Access To The Courts
Was Denied
Mr. Hill asserts that equitable tolling applies to the statute of limitations in his

post-conviction proceeding, because he was denied his right of meaningful access to
the courts in violation of Bounds. The State failed to furnish an adequate law library or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law, and as a result he suffered an
actual injury when his post-conviction petition was dismissed with prejudice.

1.

Mr. Hill's Right To Access To The Courts Was Denied Because The State
Failed To Furnish An Adequate Law Library Or Adequate Assistance From
Persons Trained In The Law

Mr. Hill asserts that his right of access to the courts was denied because the
State failed to furnish an adequate law library or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law. The Constitution requires that, to confer upon inmates the "capability
of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before

The Martinez Court ultimately determined that the defendant's post-conviction
application was barred by the statute of limitations, because any equitable tolling in his
case ceased when he obtained the assistance of counsel, and that event happened
over one year prior to the commencement of his post-conviction action. Martinez, 130
Idaho at 536-37.
2
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the courts," Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355, the State must either furnish adequate law libraries
or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. Id. at 355-56.

a.

The State Failed To Furnish An Adequate Law Library Because It
Did Not Provide Inmates With Access To Case Law

As discussed above, "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts
requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful
legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance
from persons trained in the law." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. However, the State did not
furnish an adequate law library, because the inmates had no access to case law. Even
the district court recognized that "the Idaho State penitentiary does not have a complete
law library" (R., p.274)-i.e., an "adequate law library." See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.
The adequacy of a prison law library does not per se depend on access to
particular books, but hinges on whether it confers the "capability of bringing
contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts."

See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. However, generally a prison law library only confers this
capability-a capability guaranteed by the Constitution-if it provides access to case
law.

Thus, some state courts have indicated that a prison law library that does not

provide access to case law is inadequate. See Berry v. Dep't of Corr., 697 P.2d 711
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that prisoners had asserted a cognizable claim that they
had been denied meaningful access to an adequate law library, where the prison law
library contained no current copies of the Arizona Criminal Code, Arizona statutes, or
state or federal reporters); see also Joubert v. McKeman, 588 A.2d 748, 752-53 (Me.
1991) (holding that a prisoner's right to meaningful access to the courts had been
protected because he had been provided with Maine appellate counsel, even though if
16

he had been extradited to Nebraska he would not have access to Maine or
Atlantic reporters).
In contrast, prison law libraries providing access to case law have been found to
be adequate. For example, in Bounds, the North Carolina prison library plan at issue
required the prison law libraries to stock a collection of law books, including the
following case law reporters: the North Carolina Reports, North Carolina Court of
Appeals Reports,
Supplement.

Supreme Court Reporter, Federal 2d Reporter, and Federal

Bounds, 430 U.S. at 819 and n.4.

The United States Supreme Court

affirmed the constitutionality of the prison library plan, holding that, in establishing the
law libraries, the prison administrators "exercised wide discretion within the bounds of
constitutional requirements in this case." Id. at 832-33.
The Bounds court further noted that the Nebraska prison at issue in Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), had an "adequate law library." Bounds, 430 U.S. at
824. The prison law library in McDonnell, a case where the parties stipulated that the
law library was adequate, contained case law reporters for both state and federal law.
See McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616, 618, 629-30 (D. Neb. 1972); see a/so
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824 n.10.
Similarly, in Lindquist v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.
1985), the Ninth Circuit concluded "that the law book inventory approved by the district
court meets minimum constitutional standards and provides inmates with sufficient
access to legal research materials to prepare pro se pleadings, appeals, and other legal
documents." Lindquist, 776 F.2d at 856. Following a class action suit by inmates at
ISCI alleging a denial of the right of access to the courts, the district court in Lindquist
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found certain deficiencies and approved a plan to provide the inmates with meaningful
access. Id. at 852. The inmates later appealed the district court order finding that the
prison was in compliance with the plan. Id. at 853. The law book inventory ordered by
the district court included case law reporters for both Idaho and federal law, among
them the Idaho Reports, United States Reports, and Federal Reporter. Id. at 856 and
n.1. The Ninth Circuit found that "the law book inventory approved by the district court
is substantially similar to those required by other courts." Id. at 856 (citing Cepulonis v.

Fair, 563 F. Supp. 659, 660 (D. Mass. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 732 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1984); Hardwick v. Ault, 447 F. Supp. 116, 133-34 (M.D. Ga. 1978); Smith v.

Bounds, 538 F.2d 541, 544 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)).
The prison law library in this case did not provide inmates with access to case
law. The contrast between the constitutionally adequate list of law books at ISCI from

Lindquist, 776 F.2d at 856 and n.1, and the current list of law books at ISCI is striking.
The Idaho Department of Correction's Authorized Resource Materials List for the prison
resource center includes multiple volumes of the Idaho Code and United States Code,
the Idaho Court Rules, A Jailhouse Lawyer's Manual, Shepherd's Rights of Prisoners,
and several legal dictionaries.

(R., pp.250-54.)

The resource center also provides

litigation self-help packets for various claims, including Rule 35 motions, petitions for
post-conviction, federal and state 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits, and federal and state habeas
corpus petitions. (R., pp.255-57.)
However, the Authorized Resource Materials List contains absolutely no case
law reporters. (See R., pp.250-54.) Thus, the prison simply does not provide inmates
with access to case law. Mr. Hill's supplemental affidavits from other inmates averred

18

that no case law from the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the United States District Court for Idaho-indeed, from any court-was made
available to the general inmate population. (R., pp.200, 205, 209.) At the evidentiary
hearing, one inmate, Keith Brown, testified that there was no case law available to
inmates. (Tr., p.55, Ls.8-9.) Mr. Brown explained the importance of this deficiency:
Part of-well, part of any law to be defined down is the case law that
comes from it as it's handed down by the judge that is sitting on the
bench. For instance, some of the timelines and some of the time limitation
barriers are not laid out in some of the particular statutes. They are what
is explained through case law for us to know and understand. If we don't
have case law, we can't know those.
(Tr., p.55, Ls.10-17.) Mr. Brown's testimony illustrates how the lack of access to case
law prevents inmates from knowing and understanding vital legal concepts, such as the
time requirements or limitations periods for filing claims they wish to pursue. Thus, the
lack of access to case law precludes the State from conferring the guaranteed
"capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of
confinement before the courts." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. The State therefore did
not furnish an adequate law library.
In short, the State, because it did not provide inmates with access to case law,
did not furnish an adequate law library.

b.

The State Failed To Furnish Adequate Assistance From Persons
Trained In The Law, Because The Prison Paralegals Were
Prohibited To Give Any Legal Advice

Because the State did not furnish an adequate law library, the law requires that
the State furnish adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. See Lewis, 518
U.S. at 355; Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.

But the State also failed to furnish adequate
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assistance from persons trained in the law, because the prison "paralegals" were
prohibited to give any legal advice.
The district court in this case determined that "[p]rison authorities are not
required to provide legal advice." (R., p.273.) However, the fundamental constitutional
right of access to the courts actually contemplates that "adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law" requires the provision of legal advice. In Bounds, the Court
discussed, as an alternative to adequate law libraries and another "constitutionally
acceptable method to assure meaningful access to the courts," programs providing
"some degree of professional or quasi-professional legal assistance to prisoners."

Bounds, 430 U.S. at 830-31.
Such programs take many imaginative forms and may have a number of
advantages over libraries alone. Among the alternatives are the training
of inmates as paralegal assistants to work under lawyers' supervision, the
use of paraprofessionals and law students, either as volunteers or in
formal clinical programs, the organization of volunteer attorneys through
bar associations or other groups, the hiring of lawyers on a part-time
consultant basis, and the use of full-time staff attorneys, working either in
new prison legal assistance organizations or as part of public defender or
legal services offices.

Id. at 831. The Court also discussed "[l]egal services plans," as well as "[i]ndependent
legal advisors" who "can mediate or resolve administratively many prisoner complaints
that would otherwise burden the courts, and can convince inmates that other grievances
against the person or the legal system are ill-founded, thereby facilitating rehabilitation
by assuring the inmate that he has not been treated unfairly." Id. Additionally, the Court
noted that while "a legal access program need not include any particular element we
have discussed, and we encourage local experimentation," any plan "must be evaluated
as a whole to ascertain its compliance with constitutional standards." Id. at 832.
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In Lewis, the Court highlighted "[o]ne such experiment," which replaced law
libraries "with some minimal access to legal advice and a system of court-provided
forms." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 352 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).) The Court stated that those forms "asked the inmates

to provide only the facts and not to attempt any legal analysis." Id.
The common factor among the legal assistance programs discussed by the Court
in Bounds is that they all would provide legal advice to prisoners.

All the programs

involved lawyers or others trained in the law, who would provide "professional or quasiprofessional legal assistance to prisoners." Id. at 831. Even the "experiment" brought
up in Lewis provided inmates "with some minimal access to legal advice." Lewis, 518
U.S. at 352.
Similarly, when the Idaho Court of Appeals held in Martinez v. State that article I,
section 18 of the Idaho Constitution imposes the same requirement for provision of
adequate prison law libraries or adequate legal assistance as articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Bounds, it observed that:
[w]ithout either access to Idaho legal reference books, with which to
research their rights and prepare their own pleadings, or the availability of
representation by persons trained in Idaho law and procedure, prisoners
would find the Art. I, § 18 guarantee that 'courts of justice shall be open to
every person,' a hollow promise.
Martinez, 130 Idaho at 133. Thus, the Idaho Court of Appeals also contemplated that

the constitutional guarantee of adequate legal assistance meant the provision of legal
advice-"the availability of representation by persons trained in Idaho law and
procedure." Id. (emphasis added).
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Here, the State failed to furnish adequate assistance from persons trained in the
law, because its prison paralegals were prohibited to give any legal advice. The district
court found "that the paralegals did in fact make statements that they could not provide
legal advice to [Mr.] Hill. They are not lawyers and under penitentiary policy and Idaho
State law, they cannot provide legal advice to inmates." (R., p.273.) Indeed, the Idaho
Department of Correction Standard Operating Policy on Access to Courts expressly
prohibits paralegals from "[o]ffer[ing] legal advice." 3 (R., p.244.) The Access to Courts
policy states that "[a]ssistance with grammar, spelling, or other matters not of a legal
consequence shall not be considered offering legal advice." (R., p.244.) However, as
explained above, adequate legal assistance requires the provision of legal advice. See

Bounds, 430 U.S. at 830-31, Martinez, 130 Idaho at 133. Because prison paralegals in
Idaho are prohibited to give any legal advice, the State failed to furnish adequate
assistance from persons trained in the law.

2.

Mr. Hill Suffered An Actual Injury, Because His Post-Conviction Petition
Was Dismissed With Prejudice As A Result Of The State's Failure To
Furnish Adequate Legal Assistance

Mr. Hill asserts that he has met the actual-injury requirement to allege a violation
of Bounds because, as a result of the State's failure to furnish adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law, his post-conviction petition was
dismissed with prejudice.
As discussed above, in Lewis the United States Supreme Court held that an
inmate, to establish the actual injury necessary to allege a Bounds violation, "must ...

3 The Access to Courts policy states that "[a]ssistance with grammar, spelling, or other
matters not of a legal consequence shall not be considered offering legal advice." (R.,
p.244.)
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demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program
hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. "He might show,
for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some
technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance
facilities, he could not have known." Id. Another example of an actual injury would be
where an inmate "had suffered arguable actionable harm that he wished to bring before
the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable
even to file a complaint." Id. The Court decided that one inmate in Lewis suffered an
actual injury where his case was dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 356-57.
Here, Mr. Hill has established an actual injury because he has demonstrated that
the shortcomings in Idaho's provision of law libraries and legal assistance to inmates
hindered his efforts to pursue the legal claims in his post-conviction petition. See Lewis,
518 U.S. at 351. More specifically, Mr. Hill had no way of knowing that he had to file a
post-conviction petition in order to raise the legal challenges he wished to make. (See
Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.39, L.4.)

Because Mr. Hill did not know to file a post-conviction

petition, he did not know the time constraints set by the relevant statute of limitations.
Because Mr. Hill did not know about the statute of limitations, his case was dismissed
with prejudice.

Thus, the dismissal of his post-conviction petition is an actual injury

mirroring the actual injury of one of the inmates in Lewis, who suffered an actual injury
when his case was dismissed with prejudice. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356-57.
Mr. Hill had no way of knowing that he had to file a post-conviction petition in
order to raise the legal challenges he wished to make. Because of the deficiencies in
the prison law library and the prohibition against prison paralegals giving legal advice,
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Mr. Hill had no way of knowing that a post-conviction petition was the proper means for
raising the challenges he contemplated.

The documents provided to inmates do not

inform inmates that a post-conviction petition is the proper means for challenging the
ineffective assistance of counsel or asserting that a plea was not knowing, intelligent, or
voluntary. (See R., pp.255-57.) At the evidentiary hearing, one of the prison paralegals
testified that he was unable to talk with inmates about ineffective assistance of counsel
as a possible ground for post-conviction relief. (Tr., p.107, Ls.4-15.)
Admittedly, as the district court found, Mr. Hill attended a resource center
orientation and later requested legal documents from the paralegal.

(R., pp.269-70,

275.) Additionally, prison paralegals may provide inmates with legal self-help packets,
including the post-conviction packet.

(See R., p.244.)

However, the orientation

materials and other documents Mr. Hill received do not inform inmates that a postconviction petition is the proper means for challenging the ineffective assistance of
counsel or asserting that a plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.
pp.255-57.)

(See R.,

For example, while the List of Litigation Self-help Packets generally

describes a post-conviction petition and the applicable statute of limitations, it does not
explain that a post-conviction petition may be used to raise an ineffective assistance of
counsel or knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea argument. (See R., p.255.)
Further, because the List of Litigation Self-help Packets uses an incomplete
citation when it states that "[p]ost conviction relief is available only on specific grounds
as outlined in Idaho Code § 4901 [sic]" (R., p.255), Mr. Hill had no way of knowing
which particular volume of the Idaho Code to consult to learn the grounds for postconviction relief.
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Even if Mr. Hill had been given the correct citation and consulted Idaho Code
section 19-4901, that section of the Idaho Code would not have informed him that that a
post-conviction petition is the proper means for challenging the ineffective assistance of
counsel or asserting that a plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. The statute
does not expressly mention ineffective assistance of counsel or that a plea was not
knowing, intelligent, or voluntary as grounds for post-conviction relief. See l.C. § 194901 (a).
Rather, only Idaho case law states that a post-conviction claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel comes under Idaho Code section 19-4901 (a)(4), which allows for
a post-conviction proceeding on an inmate's claim "[t]hat there exists evidence of
material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the
conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." See Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272,
274 (1990); Kraft v. State, 100 Idaho 671, 673-74 (1979) (per curiam). Similarly, Idaho
case law, and not Idaho Code section 19-4901, indicates that an inmate's claim that his
or her plea was involuntary may come under the rubric of ineffective assistance of
counsel in a post-conviction proceeding. See Gee v. State, 117 Idaho 107 (Ct. App.
1990) (addressing a post-conviction appeal where an inmate alleged that the ineffective
assistance of his counsel rendered his plea in the underlying criminal case involuntary).
But Mr. Hill could not have known that Idaho case law states that an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim comes under Idaho Code section 19-4901(a)(4), because
the prison law library (as discussed above) did not provide any access to case law.
Thus, Mr. Hill had no way of knowing that he had to file a post-conviction petition to
raise the challenges he contemplated.
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Because Mr. Hill had no way of knowing that he had to file a post-conviction
petition, he did not know about the time constraints set by the relevant statute of
limitations. 4 At the evidentiary hearing, when asked if he could have filed the postconviction petition after he left segregation and regained access to his legal documents,
Mr. Hill answered, "I could have, but any time you asked that gentleman [the paralegal]
anything he tells you I can't give you legal advice." (Tr., p.31, Ls.21-25.) Later, Mr. Hill
testified that the paralegal "won't tell you time limits." (Tr., p.40, L.2.)

Because the

paralegals were prohibited to give legal advice, Mr. Hill was never told about the statute
of limitations for post-conviction proceedings, or that the post-conviction petition he did
file would be untimely. Thus, because the deficiencies in the prison legal library and
legal assistance program left Mr. Hill with no way of knowing that he had to file a postconviction petition, he did not know about the time constraints set by the statute
of limitations.
Because Mr. Hill did not know about the statute of limitations, his post-conviction
petition was dismissed with prejudice. Mr. Hill's post-conviction petition was dismissed
with prejudice after the district court determined that it was not filed within the statute of
limitations and the equitable tolling doctrine did not apply. (R., p.275.) Mr. Hill could not
have known that his post-conviction petition would be dismissed for failure to meet the
statute of limitations because of the deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance

As discussed above, the statute of limitations for post-conviction proceedings provides
that "[a]n application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of
the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a
proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 19-4902(a).
4

26

facilities-namely,

the failure to provide an adequate law library or adequate

legal assistance.
The dismissal of Mr. Hill's post-conviction petition with prejudice is akin to the
case of the inmate in Lewis, who suffered an actual injury when his case was dismissed
with prejudice. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356-57. Thus, Mr. Hill has demonstrated "that
the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts
to pursue a legal claim," and he has shown an actual injury sufficient to allege a Bounds
violation. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.
While the district court concluded that any actual injury or "prejudice" to Mr. Hill
was from Mr. Hill's own failure to timely request assistance, rather than the paralegal's
inadequate advice or improper training (R., p.274), the standard articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Lewis goes against that conclusion. The Lewis Court
stated that:
[w]hen any inmate . . . shows that an actionable claim [against his
sentence or conditions of confinement] which he desired to bring has been
lost or rejected . . . because this capability of filing suit has not been
provided, he demonstrates that the State has failed to furnish "adequate
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law."

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356 (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828) (emphasis in original).
Even if Mr. Hill failed to timely request assistance, he has shown that his actionable
post-conviction claims which he desired to bring have been rejected because the State
did not provide the required capacity to file suit.

See id.

Thus, Mr. Hill has met the

actual-injury requirement for establishing a violation of his constitutional fundamental
right of access to the courts.
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In sum, the State failed to furnish an adequate law library or adequate assistance
from persons trained in the law. Mr. Hill suffered an actual injury from this deficiency
because his post-conviction petition was dismissed with prejudice as a result of the
failure to furnish adequate law libraries or adequate legal assistance. Thus, Mr. Hill has
demonstrated that his right of meaningful access to the courts was denied.
Because Mr. Hill, for purposes of the Bounds standard, has demonstrated that
his right of access to the courts was denied, he has also demonstrated that equitable
tolling applies to the statute of limitations in his post-conviction proceeding.

See

Ochieng, 147 Idaho at 626, Martinez, 130 Idaho at 535-36; see also Rhoades, 148

Idaho at 251 (observing that post-conviction petitions may raise important due process
issues sufficient to trigger equitable tolling).

Put otherwise, equitable tolling applies

because Mr. Hill was "effectively denied access to the courts." See Ochieng, 147 Idaho
at 626. The statute of limitations should have been tolled. 5
Mr. Hill pleaded facts sufficient to trigger equitable tolling and avoid the dismissal
of his petition. See Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250. Thus, the district court erred when it
dismissed with prejudice Mr. Hill's petition for post-conviction relief, because Mr. Hill
was denied his right of access to the courts and equitable tolling therefore applies.

Mr. Hill acknowledges that, in his reply to the notice to dismiss, he asserted that the
statute of limitations should have been equitably tolled for approximately 70 to 110
days. (See R., pp.43-45.) However, the statute of limitations arguably should have
been equitably tolled for a longer period. Mr. Hill learned that he should file a postconviction to deal with the legal issues he wanted to raise only after he spoke with
Mr. Brown about his case. (See Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.39, L.4.) Mr. Brown helped Mr. Hill
prepare his post-conviction petition. (Tr., p.39, Ls.1-3.) Thus, the statute of limitations
could be equitably tolled for the period before Mr. Hill spoke to Mr. Brown about
his case. Mr. Hill and Mr. Brown spoke about Mr. Hill's case on or around June 3, 2012,
which was the day that Mr. Hill requested a post-conviction packet. (See Tr., p.46, L.18
- p.47, L.13.)
5
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Hill respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
district court's memorandum opinion and judgment dismissing with prejudice his petition
for post-conviction relief, and remand the case for further proceedings on the merits of
Mr. Hill's petition.
DATED this 15th day of August, 2013.

BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY (_"':'S
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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